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Abstract
In re Estate of Greenberg’ addresses the constitutionality of Florida’s
laws on administration of estates. The central issue is whether a nonresident,
unrelated to the testator, can act as personal representative of
the decedent’s estate.
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The Fate Of A Non-Resident Personal Representative:
In re Estate of Greenberg
In re Estate of Greenberg' addresses the constitutionality of Florida's
laws on administration of estates. The central issue is whether a non-
resident, unrelated to the testator, can act as personal representative of
the decedent's estate. Reaffirming the states' power to control the ad-
ministration of estates of their citizens and recognizing the legislative
origin of the right to dispose of property after death, the court upheld
the constitutionality of Florida Statutes §§ 733.3022 and 733.304.3
1. 390 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1980). The United States Supreme Court dismissed this
case for lack of a substantial federal question. 49 U.S.L.W. 3633, 3642 (March 3,
1981). Since Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 334 (1975), any case dismissed for lack
of a substantial federal question constitutes a disposition on the merits. Therefore, the
constitutionality of sections 733.302 and 733.304 of the Florida Statutes has been up-
held. See generally Lewis, Is the Supreme Court Creating Unknown and Unknowable
Law? The Insubstantial Federal Question Dismissal, 5 NOVA L.J. 11 (1980).
2. FLA. STAT. § 733.302 (1979) provides:
Subject to the limitations in this part, any person sui juris who is a citizen of
the United States and a resident of Florida at the time of the death of the person
whose estate he seeks to administer is qualified to act as personal representative
in Florida. A person who has been convicted of a felony or who, from sickness,
intemperance, or want of understanding, is incompetent to discharge the duties
of a personal representative is not qualified.
In In re the Estate of Fernandez, 335 So. 2d 829 (Fla. 1976), we held that
the United States citizenship requirement contained in section 733.302, Florida
Statutes (1975), was invalid because such requirement violated the equal protec-
tion clauses of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution and
article I, section 2 of the Florida Constitution. Therein, we recognized that the
statutory requirement that a person appointed as an administrator be a resident
of Florida guaranteed the basic ability of one to perform the duties of a personal
representative, but we held that the additional requirement of United States citi-
zenship had no bearing on ability. In 1979, the legislature amended section
733.302 to eliminate the requirement of United States citizenship. Chapter 79-
343, Laws of Florida (1979). The amendment deleted only the language, "is a
citizen of the United States and," but left the remainder of the statute
unchanged.
Id. at 41 n.1.
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In reaching its conclusion, the supreme court affirmed the trial
court's decision denying Meyer Pincus' petition for appointment as co-
personal representative to Leo Greenberg's estate. Mr. Greenberg died
a resident of Florida. In his will, he named his son and accountant co-
personal representatives of his estate and Mr. Pincus as successor per-
sonal representative. Before Mr. Greenberg moved to Florida, Meyer
Pincus had acted as his attorney and tax advisor. When the accountant
renounced his right to serve as co-personal representative, Mr. Pincus
agreed to replace him. However, the court denied permission since Mr.
Pincus was neither a relative of the testator as defined by section
733.304 nor a resident of Florida as required by section 733.302.'
Greenberg illustrates the supreme court's endorsement of the con-
stitutionality of the Florida Statutes controlling the administration of
the estates of Florida citizens. According to the court these statutes
withstand challenges that they violate the equal protection and due pro-
cess clauses of the fourteenth amendment 5 and the privileges and im-
munities clause of article IV, section 2 of the United States Constitu-
tion.6 In Greenberg, Mr. Pincus alleged that these statutes denied the
testator's fundamental right to choose the person to administer his es-
3. FLA. STAT. § 733.304 (1977) provides:
A person who is not domiciled in the state cannot qualify as a personal
representative unless the person is:
(1) A legally adopted child or adoptive parent of the decedent;
(2) Related by lineal consanguinity to the decedent;
(3) A spouse or a brother, sister, uncle, aunt, nephew, or niece of the dece-
dent; or
(4) The spouse of a person otherwise qualified under this section.
Id. n.2. In 1979 this section was amended. Clause 3 now reads "a spouse or a brother,
sister, uncle, aunt, nephew, or niece of the decedent, or someone related by lineal con-
sanguinity to any such person." Id. (1979).
4. See text of statutes as set forth in notes 2 & 3 supra.
5. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdic-
tion thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they re-
side. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any per-
son of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
6. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1: "The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to
all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States."
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tate. Futher, Mr. Pincus argued that these statutes abridge the testa-
tor's fundamental right to travel. Finally, Mr. Pincus argued that the
statutes abridged his fundamental right to pursue a livelihood.'
I. EQUAL PROTECTION
A. Brief History
The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution pro-
hibits the states from denying to any person within their jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.8 In modern equal protection cases, the
key is to identify the proper standard of judicial review. The rational
basis or minimum scrutiny test, generally applied in cases involving
equal protection challenges, allows any imaginable state of facts to up-
hold the legislative enactment as reasonable for achieving a legitimate
legislative purpose.9 A statutory classification will be held "unconstitu-
7. Answer Brief of Amicus Curiae, The Florida Bar, Real Property, Probate and
Trust Law Section at 5, In re Estate of Greenberg, 390 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1980) [herein-
after cited as Answer Brief].
8. See note 5 supra.
9. The Court in Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911)
stated the rules by which this contention must be tested:
1. The equal protection of the Fourteenth Amendment does not take from
the State the power to classify in the adoption of police laws, but admits of the
exercise of a wise scope of discretion in that regard, and avoids what is done only
when it is without any reasonable basis and therefore is purely arbitrary.
2. A classification having some reasonable basis does not offend against that
clause merely because it is not made with mathematical nicety or because in
practice it results in some inequality.
3. When the classification in such a law is called in question, if any state of
facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it, the existence of that
state of facts at the time the law was enacted must be assumed.
4. One who assails the classification in such a law must carry the burden of
showing that it does not rest upon any reasonable basis, but is essentially arbi-
trary (citations omitted).
In Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970), the Court stated that its business
did not include determining whether a regulation is wise, only that it best fulfills the
relevant social economic objective. "[T]he equal protection clause does not require that
a State must choose between attacking every aspect of a problem or not attacking the
problem at all. It is enough that the State's action be rationally based and free from
invidious discrimination." Id. at 487 (citations omitted).
499 1
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tionally violative of the equal protection clause under this test if it
causes different treatment so disparate" that the classification is "whol-
ly arbitrary."10 The burden of showing there is no rational basis for the
classification is on the party attacking the statute."' However, this bur-
den is practically insurmountable for there is almost always some basis
for the legislative judgment that the measure promotes public
interest.12
On the other hand, application of the strict scrutiny test usually
nullifies the presumption of constitutionality and "is almost always fa-
tal in its application."1 s This test requires the state to justify its classifi-
cation as a necessary means to achieve a compelling state interest when
either (a) a suspect classification1 4 or (b) a fundamental interest1 5 ex-
10. 390 So. 2d at 42.
11. See note 9 supra.
12. E.g., Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976); Village of Belle Terre v.
Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974); Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952);
Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949); McDonald v. Board
of Election, 394 U.S. 802 (1969).
13. 390 So. 2d at 42-43. Cf. note 9 supra (when rational basis test is applied the
statute is generally upheld).
14. The Supreme Court has identified two types of classification as suspect, call-
ing for strict judicial scrutiny: (1) race, see, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S.
483 (1954) and (2) alienage, see, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214
(1944), and In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973).
15. The Supreme Court has identified two fundamental interests which, if in-
vaded, call for strict scrutiny: (1) equal access to voting, see, e.g., Kramer v. Union
Free School Dist. Number 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330
(1972); Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51 (1973); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533
(1964); and (2) a cluster of interests related to marriage and procreation, see, e.g.,
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Skin-
ner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
The Court has also found discrimination against exercise of constitutional rights
may invade a fundamental right of privacy, see, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979). The Court has
also examined discrimination in the context of (1) the right to travel, see, e.g., Shapiro
v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S.
250 (1974); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975); Califano v. Torres, 435 U.S. 1
(1978); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); (2) the right to pursue a livelihood,
see, e.g., Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 (1978); and (3) first amendment rights, see,
e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
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plicitly or implicitly protected by the Constitution is present in the
case.
B. Mr. Pincus' Argument
Realizing the futility of presenting his challenge under the rational
basis test, Mr. Pincus argued that the strict scrutiny test should be
applied. This test would have been applicable had the statutes actually
impinged upon the testator's fundamental right to appoint his personal
representative, penalized his fundamental right to travel or abridged
Mr. Pincus' fundamental right to pursue a livelihood. 17 However, the
United States Supreme Court has carefully and narrowly defined the
list of fundamental rights explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the
Constitution. Therefore, unless Mr. Pincus' allegations involved either a
suspect classification or a recognized fundamental right, the rational
basis test had to be applied.18
"Mr. Pincus characterize[d] as fundamental the testator's right to
appoint a personal representative; thus impelling application of the
strict scrutiny test."19 However, Pincus attempted to bootstrap the
right to appoint a personal representative to the definition of "liberty"
in Meyer v. Nebraska20 and the recognized fundamental right which
protects family relationship,21 thereby creating a new fundamental in-
16. See note 15 supra.
17. Id.
18. The Court has confronted other classifications arguably suspect in nature,
but has not yet held them to be suspect. These classifications include: illegitimacy, see,
e.g., Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976); gender, see, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 190 (1976); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977); Califano v. Webster, 430
U.S. 313 (1977); wealth or indigency, see, e.g., James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137
(1971); San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Maher
v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); and age, see, e.g., Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v.
Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976). The Court also refused to extend the list of fundamental
interests to other important areas such as adequate housing, see, e.g., Lindsey v.
Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972); welfare assistance, see, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397
U.S. 471 (1970); employment, see, e.g., Idaho Dep't of Employment v. Smith, 434 U.S.
100 (1977).
19. In re Estate of Greenberg, 390 So. 2d at 43.
20. 262 U.S. 390 (1973).
21. See note 15 supra.
15:1981
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The Florida Supreme Court held that this right to appoint a per-
sonal representative was not a fundamental right and properly followed
United States Supreme Court precedent establishing that "the Su-
preme Court does not pick out particular . . . activities, characterize
them as fundamental, and then give them added protection." 23 The
United States Supreme Court emphasized that it is not within its
"province to create substantial rights by guaranteeing equal protec-
tion."2 ' Further, the Court declared that it is not sufficient to charac-
terize a right as fundamental "just because state legislation affects a
matter gravely important to society. ' 25 "The Constitution does not pro-
vide judicial remedies for every social and economic ill and the Su-
preme Court will only recognize an established constitutional right and
give to that right no less protection than the Constitution itself
demands. 26
The Constitution does not govern the right to control inheritance,
descent, or distribution. The power to create rules establishing, protect-
ing and strengthening life, as well as regulating the disposition of prop-
erty, is reserved to the legislatures of the states.27 The vague generali-
ties of the equal protection clause are not applicable.28 Therefore, since
the power is reserved to the states, "nothing forbids the legislatures
from limiting, conditioning or even abolishing the power of testamen-
tary disposition of property within their jurisdiction."2
22. Brief for Appellant at 8, In re Estate of Greenberg, 390 So. 2d (Fla. 1980).
23. 390 So. 2d at 43. See also San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodri-
guez, 411 U.S. 1, 31 (1973).
24. 390 So. 2d at 43. "The Supreme Court of the United States has refused to
expand fundamental rights beyond those explicitly guaranteed by the constitution." Id.
25. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 73-74 (1972).
26. 390 So. 2d at 43.
27. Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 538 (1971).
28. Id. at 538-40. See also Mager v. Grima, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 490, 493 (1850).
Now the law in question is nothing more than an exercise of the power which
every state and sovereignty possesses, of regulating the manner and term upon
which property real or personal within its dominion may be transmitted by last
will and testament, or by inheritance; and of prescribing who shall and who shall
not be capable of taking it.
Id.
29. 390 So. 2d at 43. See also Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 771 (1977).
502 Nova Law Journal 5:1981 1
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The Florida Supreme Court reemphasized this position stating
"that the power to alienate any species of property by a last will and
testament has never been an inherent right in the citizen, but is derived
from legislation."30 In most jurisdictions, statutes create the decedent's
right to name a personal representative to administer his estate. How-
ever, since this right is created by statute, the requirements must be
strictly complied with.3 1 State legislation has established that courts
have no jurisdiction to issue letters of administration to the personal
representative nominated in the will unless such discretion is granted
by statute.3 2 Thus, sections 733.302 and 733.304 of the Florida Stat-
utes specifically disqualify Pincus from serving as personal representa-
tive, since he is not related to the testator or a resident of Florida.33
In certain instances, the United States Supreme Court has recog-
nized the right to domestic travel as a protectable fundamental interest,
requiring the strict scrutiny analysis, which cannot be abridged by the
states." Whether it is protected against congressional action may be an
open question in light of the deferential treatment given to such legisla-
tion by the United States Supreme Court.35 The right to foreign travel
The Court there stated that orderly disposition of property at death is a matter particu-
larly within the competence of the state.
30. Thomas v. Williamson, 51 Fla. 332, _, 40 So. 831, 834 (1906) (Taylor, J.,
concurring). See also In re Sharp's Estate, 133 Fla. 802, 183 So. 470 (1938); Taylor v.
Payne, 154 Fla. 359, 17 So. 2d 615 (1944), appeal dismissed, 323 U.S. 666 (1944).
See generally REDFEARN, WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION IN FLORIDA § 20.13 (5th ed.
1977).
31. State v. North, 159 Fla. 351, _, 32 So. 2d 14, 18 (1947).
32. Id. See also In re Crosby's Estate, 218 Minn. 149, _, 15 N.W.2d 401, 505
(1944). "The legislature has the unquestioned power to qualify a testator's right of
appointing an executor and may even wholly deprive the testator of that right, for the
right to make a will is purely a statutory right, subject to the complete control of the
legislature." Id. (citations omitted).
33. See notes 2 & 3 supra.
34. See note 15 supra.
35. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 286 (1970) (Stewart, J., concurring):
"[A]s against the reserved power of the states, it is enough that the end to which
Congress has acted be one legitimately within its power and that there be a rational
basis for the measures chosen to achieve that end." See also, McCulloch v. Maryland,
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819): "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the
scope of the court, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adopted to
that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the Consti-
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is protected against congressional invasion by the due process clause of
the fifth amendment."8
This right to travel has been protected as a fundamental right only
when a durational residency requirement is imposed by a state as a
condition precedent to receiving the privileges and benefits of a state, 7
and when the requirement serves to penalize the exercise of that right
to travel.38 However, the United States Supreme Court has cautioned
that an appropriately defined and uniformly applied residency require-
ment will be upheld. 9 But generally "the right to interstate travel must
be seen as insuring new residents the same right to vital governmental
benefits in the state to which they migrate as are enjoyed by other re-
sidents" of that state. 0
Mr. Pincus alleged that sections 733.302 and 733.304 of the Flor-
ida Statutes violate the testator's right to travel in that the testator
should be allowed the same rights and privileges in Florida as he en-
joyed in the state from which he came. The United States Supreme
Court has specifically rejected such a proposition.41 The Court reasoned
that "the broader implications of this transposition, in other areas of
substantive law, would destroy the independent power of each state
tution, are constitutional."
36. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958); cf Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965)
(Congress can constitutionally authorize the President to deny passports for travel to
designated areas where justified by national security concerns).
37. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972): "We emphasize
again the difference between bona fide residence requirements and durational residency
requirements." "Obviously, durational residency laws single out the class of bona fide
state and county residents who have recently exercised this constitutionally protected
right, and penalize such travelers directly." Id. at 338. See also, e.g., Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250
(1974); McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil Serv. Comm'n, 424 U.S. 645 (1976); Califano
v. Torres, 435 U.S. 1 (1978); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
38. Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 261 (1974).
39. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342 (1972); cf. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S.
393 (1975) (a one-year residency requirement as a condition on seeking a divorce in
state courts is valid). See also Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679 (1973).
40. 415 U.S. at 261.
41. In Califano v. Torres, 435 U.S. 1, 4 (1978), the Court stated that the right
to interstate travel does not require that a person who travels from one state to another
be given benefits superior to those enjoyed by residents of states to which he travels
merely because he enjoyed those rights in the state from which he came.
Nova Law Journal
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under the Constitution to enact laws uniformly applicable to all of its
residents." '42
Sections 733.302 and 733.304 of the Florida Statutes do not con-
tain a durational residency requirement and nothing prohibits a nonres-
ident personal representative from taking up residence in Florida prior
to qualifying as a personal representative. 43 Thus, these statutes do not
penalize the testator's right to travel as defined by the United States
Supreme Court where it has applied the strict scrutiny test.
Further attempting to invoke the strict scrutiny test, Mr. Pincus
contended that his fundamental right to pursue a livelihood44 was vio-
lated by the statutes at issue. In Hicklin v. Orbeck,'5 the United States
Supreme Court held that an Alaskan "hire law," which contained a
one year durational residency requirement before non-residents could
work on the Alaskan pipeline, violated the non-resident's right to pur-
sue a livelihood. However, in Baldwin v. Montana Fish and Game
Commission,' the Court stated that (1) it did not decide the full range
of activities sufficiently basic to the livelihood of the nation and (2) that
the states may not interfere with a non-resident's participation without
similarly interfering with a resident's participation.
The Florida Supreme Court held that, since there was no funda-
mental right to appoint a personal representative explicitly or implicitly
guaranteed by the United States Constitution,' 7 there was no funda-
mental right to serve as a personal representative. 48 Mr. Pincus' argu-
ment did not persuade the court. He claimed that serving as a personal
representative and earning an incidental fee was equivalent to the fun-
damental right to pursue a livelihood.4 9 Moreover, Pincus was not li-
42. Id. at 4-5.
43. Answer Brief at 15.
44. See note 15 supra.
45. 437 U.S. 518 (1978).
46. 436 U.S. 371, 381 (1978). See also Davis v. Rose, 97 Fla. 710, 122 So. 225
(1929).
47. In re Estate of Greenberg, 390 So. 2d at 43.
48. Id. at 45.
49. This court [should] have little sympathy for that sideline to the prac-
tice of law, just as it would regard real estate commissions generated by a
lawyer's law practice if he held a brokerage license, as a part of his liveli-
hood entitled to protection as a fundamental right. Moreover, in instances
which a testator's attorney is named a personal representative, it is with
505 1
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censed to practice law in Florida. 0
Similar to the fundamental right to travel, residency requirements
also have been considered when analyzing the fundamental right to
pursue a livelihood. When confronted with the question of whether a
residency requirement for admission to the Puerto Rico Bar unconstitu-
tionally deprived an individual of his right to pursue a livelihood, the
Court in Ward v. Board of Examiners,51 held that residency is not a
suspect classification. The Court further stated that the actual resi-
dency requirement did not burden a fundamental right. The Court uti-
lized the rational basis analysis and upheld the non-durational resi-
dency requirement for admission to the bar. In Greenberg, the Florida
Supreme Court expressly recognized the state residency requirement of
section 733.302 of the Florida Statutes.5
Since the legislation in question affected neither a suspect class
nor a fundamental right, the rational basis or minimum scrutiny test
invalidated this equal protection challenge.5 Utilizing this test, the
Florida Supreme Court held that the statutes bear a reasonable rela-
tionship to a legitimate state objective and therefore did not deny Mr.
Pincus the right to pursue a livelihood."
the thought that administration expenses will be saved by virtue [of] com-
bining the personal representative and the personal representative's attor-
ney into one office. In the typical example in which the testator migrated
to Florida having named his northern lawyer as personal representative,
the assumption that the testator had made in naming the lawyer would be
no longer valid, because the lawyer's inability to practice law in the State
of Florida would prevent the saving in administration expenses that had
been contemplated.
Answer Brief at 17.
50. Id.; see also Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438 (1979).
51. 409 F. Supp. 1258, 1259 (D.P.R. 1976). In re Estate of Fernandez, 335 So.
2d 829 (Fla. 1976).
52. 390 So. 2d at 45.
53. Id.
54. Cf. Fain v. Hall, 463 F. Supp. 661 (M.D. Fla. 1979) (The court applied
strict scrutiny analysis and held blood requirement for qualification of non-resident per-
sonal representative was unconstitutional). But see 390 So. 2d at 43, where the court
stated that "[n]otwithstanding the decision of the federal district court in [Fain],
which [they found] to be wholly unpersuasive. . . that the right to appoint a personal
representative is not one of the fundamental rights implicating utilization of the strict
scrutiny test."
10
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What then are the legitimate state interests? The state "recog-
nized that the administration of a decedent's estate is an intensely lo-
calized matter requiring the personal representative to be thoroughly
informed on local matters and to be available to the court, beneficiaries
and creditors of the estate. '5 5 Even though availability is used in a
broader sense than when the word is used in reference to service of
process, 8 the search for a legitimate state interest could have ended
here. The United States Supreme Court held that if there exists a rea-
sonably conceived state of facts, the classification of a law will be sus-
tained. 7 Amenability to service of process has been recognized as a
legitimate state interest for upholding the residency requirement in sec-
tion 733.302 of the Florida Statutes, 8 and has passed the strict scru-
tiny test.59
Nevertheless, the state also declared
that these statutes serve the valid function of insuring that the personal
representative, if not a relative of the testator, is close enough in proxim-
ity to the Florida estate to protect the rights of the creditors, insure that
the estate will be probated without needless delays caused by travel, and
reduce the cost of representation to the estate by reducing travel costs or.
preventing the need to associate an in-state representative.Y
The dissent agreed that the rationality standard of review was ap-
propriate, but argued that the state's interest in reducing "delay in the
administration of estates," and costs incurred through "travel and the
association of an in-state representative" and insuring "proximity to
the interests of the Florida estate to protect interested parties' rights"
did not pass the rational basis test.61 It argued that the "state's classifi-
cation for qualified non-resident personal representative [was] arbitrary
and irrational . . . denying equal protection of the laws. 62 On one
55. 390 So. 2d at 45.
56. Answer Brief at 23A. See generally FLA. STAT. § 733.612 (Supp. 1980).
57. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911).
58. In re Estate of Fernandez, 335 So. 2d 829, 830 (Fla. 1976).
59. Id. at 831.
60. 390 So. 2d at 45, 46.
61. 390 So. 2d at 49, 50 (dissenting opinion).
62. Id. at 49.
5071
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hand, the dissent wanted to act as a super-legislature 3 and strike down
the residency statute. On the other hand, it called on the legislature to
gather its collective mind and make the statute applicable to personal
representatives, resident and non-resident."
However, "[e]qual protection does not require a state to choose
between attacking every aspect of a problem or not attacking it at
all. .... ,5 Further, a statutory classification will not be set aside if
any set of facts may reasonably be conceived to sustain the classifica-
tion.6 Additionally, the dissent cannot overlook decisions of its own
court which reiterate the same propositions.67 The Florida Supreme
Court has stated that "it is not unreasonable for an exception to be
created for non-resident relatives because, more than likely, the non-
resident relative will also be a beneficiary of the decedent's estate.6 8
Furthermore, the argument that the statute has not gone far enough to
provide equal protection of the laws was specifically rejected by the
United States Supreme Court.69
In summary, since none of Pincus' arguments fall within the defi-
nition of a suspect class or a fundamental interest the rational basis test
must be applied. In the application of this test, the court held that sec-
tions 733.302 and 733.304 of the Florida Statutes bear a reasonable
relationship to a legitimate state objective. Hence, these sections do not
violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
II. PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES
Additionally, Pincus contended that the operation of the residency
requirement in the challenged statutes violated the privilege and immu-
nities clause of article IV, section 2 of the United States Constitution.7 0
The United States Supreme Court hgs upheld as permissible "[s]ome
63. See note 9 supra.
64. 390 So. 2d at 51 (dissenting opinion).
65. 390 So. 2d at 46; Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486-87 (1970).
66. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911).
67. See, e.g., Newman v. Carson, 280 So. 2d 426, 429 (Fla. 1973); Finlayson v.
Conner, 167 So. 2d 569, 571 (Fla. 1964); Liquor Store Inc. v. Continental Distilling
Corp., 40 So. 2d 371, 384 (Fla. 1949).
68. 390 So. 2d at 46.
69. 397 U.S. at 487.
70. See note 6 supra.
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distinctions between residents and nonresidents [which] merely reflect
. . . that this is a nation composed of individual states. . . ." On the
other hand, the Court prohibits those distinctions which hinder the for-
mation, purpose, or development of a single union.~
The Florida Supreme Court explained that the privileges and im-
munities clause secures for the citizens of a state the same freedoms
existing in other states as to the acquisition and enjoyment of property,
pursuit of happiness and guarantee of equal protection of the laws.7 2
Thus, the privileges and immunities clause secures to citizens of each
state those virtues of their status as citizens which are common to the
citizens in other states under their constitution and law.7 3 "Performing
the task of personal representative does not rise to the level of a privi-
lege or immunity bearing upon the vitality of the nation as a single
entity' 74 and certainly is not common to all states. 5 Therefore, the
residency requirement for personal representatives does not violate the
privileges and immunities clause.
III. DUE PROCESS OF FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (IRREBUT-
TABLE PRESUMPTIONS)
During the 1970's, the United States Supreme Court employed a
new form of heightened scrutiny to review statutory classifications
which contained rules denying a benefit or placing a burden on all indi-
viduals possessing a certain defined characteristic. This scrutiny was
characterized as an irrebuttable presumption 76 (e.g., all women after
their fifth month of pregnancy are incapable of working).
Under equal protection standards and other standards utilizing
strict scrutiny, a perfect meeting between the purpose of the state stat-
ute and the classification created by the statute is not required. The
71. Baldwin v. Montana Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 383 (1978).
72. Hoadley v. Insurance Comm'r, of Fla., 37 Fla. 564, , 20 So. 772, 775
(1896).
73. Id.
74. 390 So. 2d at 49. See In re Mulford, 217 Ill. 242, _, 75 N.E. 345, 346
(1905).
75. Answer Brief at A-6 & A-7 (see survey of eligibility of non-resident personal
representative statutes).
76. Note, The Irrebutable Presumption Doctrine In The Supreme Court, 87
HARV. L. REv. 1534 n.7 (1974).
1 5:1981
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irrebuttable presumption analysis was a furtive maneuver, under the
guise of due process, to impose "extraordinarily strict safeguards on
overinclusive classification." "In practice, the application of this anal-
ysis invalidated the generalization and produced a requirement for indi-
vidualized hearings. "78 The Court in Vlandis v. Kline, held that if it is
not necessarily or universally true in fact the basic fact implies the pre-
sumed fact, and the statute's irrebuttable presumption denies due pro-
cess of law.79
However, as rapidly as the irrebuttable presumption doctrine
emerged in the early 1970's, its decline was not far behind. Chief Jus-
tice Burger wrote in his dissenting opinion in Vlandis that this doctrine
represented a transfer of the compelling state interest test from the
equal protection area into the due process area.80 He further stated
that the Court's function in constitutional adjudication is "not to see
whether there is some conceivably less restrictive alternative to the
statutory classification under review since all legislation might be im-
proved by such an individualized determination."81 In Cleveland Board
of Education v. LaFleur,82 Mr. Justice Powell (concurring in result)8
and Mr. Justice Rehnquist (dissenting)8" espoused similar views.
Finally, in Weinberger v. Salf,85 the Court addressed a claim that
a federal statute violated due process. The majority stated the issue as
"whether Congress, [concerned] . . . by the possibility of an abuse
which it legitimately desired to avoid, could have rationally concluded
both that a particular limitation or qualification would protect against
its occurrence,-and that the expense and other difficulties of individual
determinations justified the inherent imprecission of a prophylactic
rule."8 6 Two years later in Ulsery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co.,87 the
77. G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 969 (10th ed. 1980).
78. Id. at 970.
79. 412 U.S. 441, 452 (1973). See also Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972);
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
80. 412 U.S. 441, 459-60 (1973) (dissenting opinion).
81. Id. at 460.
82. 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
83. 414 U.S. 632, 651 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring in result).
84. 414 U.S. 632, 657 (1974) (dissenting opinion).
85. 422 U.S. 749 (1975).
86. Id. at 777.
87. 428 U.S. 1 (1976).
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Court further clarified its holding in Weinberger and applied the ra-
tional basis analysis to uphold a federal law containing two irrebuttable
presumptions."
The Weinberger and Turner Elkhorn decisions illustrate that
"[j]ust as. . .severe limitations [were] placed upon the strict scrutiny
test in equal protection cases, the irrebuttable presumption doctrine
' .* has now been limited . . . so that legislation that creates an ir-
rebuttable presumption will be examined by the deferential test of a
rational relationship in matters of economic legislation."8' 9 A strict
scrutiny analysis will only be applied when a classification is at least
arguably suspect' 0 or when there is an interest that is at least arguably
fundamental. 1
In this instance, Pincus had no fundamental right compromised
and he did not belong to a suspect class. Therefore, the rational basis
analysis was proper in light of Weinberger and Turner Elkhorn. Hence,
sections 733.302 and 733.304 of the Florida Statutes do not violate the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment since they represent a
rational means of accomplishing a legitimate state goal.
IV. THE, CONTENTION OF AMICUS CURIAE - DUAL PROBATE
The Florida Supreme Court properly concluded that sections
733.302 and 733.304 of the Florida Statutes are constitutional. The
court arrived at this decision based upon principles established by the
United States Supreme Court under the privileges and immunities
clause and the equal protection and due process clauses of the four-
teenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States.92
However, this lengthy analysis may have been unnecessary had
consideration been given to an argument put forth in the answer brief
of amicus curiae. 8 This well taken argument deals with the concept of
dual probate which vitiates all constitutional arguments made by Mr.
88. 422 U.S. 749 (1975).
89. Answer Brief at 34.
90. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
91. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
92. 390 So. 2d at 49.
93. Answer Brief at 3.
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Pincus. 9"
As previously set forth, Mr. Pincus alleged that the testator's con-
stitutional right to travel and his fundamental right to choose a per-
sonal representative were denied. Additionally Mr. Pincus' own right to
earn fees for administering the estate was prohibited by sections
733.302 and 733.304 of the Florida Statutes which disallow an unre-
lated non-resident from becoming a personal representative in Florida.
The concept of dual probate has been widely employed by other
states and was adopted in Florida in 1978.11 In essence the original
probate of the will of a decedent, domiciled in Florida at the time of
death, will be simultaneously probated in Florida and New York. The
New York administration, with Mr. Pincus as personal representative,
could have disposed of most or all of the decedent's estate, including all
of the personal property owned by the decedent even though it was
situated in Florida at the time of death.9 6
Dual probate should not be confused with the concept of ancillary
administration. Ancillary administration applies when a person dies
leaving real property in another state. Primary administration takes
place in the state of the decedent's domicile and ancillary administra-
94. Id. at 5.
95. FLA. STAT. § 731.106(2) (Supp. 1980):
When a non-resident decedent who is a citizen of the United States or a citizen
or subject of a foreign country provides in his will that the testamentary disposi-
tion of his tangible or intangible personal property having a situs within this
state, or of his real prqpery in this state, shall be construed and regulated by the
laws of this state, the validity and effect of the dispositions shall be determined
by Florida law. The court may, and in the case of a decedent who was at the
time of his death a resident of a foreign country the court shall, direct the per-
sonal representative appointed in this state to make distribution directly to those
designated by the decedent's will as beneficiaries of the tangible or intangible
property or to the persons entitled to receive the decedent's personal estate under
the laws of the decedent's domicile, as the case may be.
96. N.Y. [EST., POWERS & TRusTs] LAW § 3-5.1(h) (Consol. 1979):
Whenever a testator, not domiciled in this state at the time of death, pro-
vides in his will that he elects to have the disposition of his property situated in
this state governed by the laws of this state, the intrinsic validity, including the
testator's general capacity, effect, interpretation, revocation or alteration of any
such disposition is determined by the local law of this state. The formal validity
of the will, in such case is determined in accordance with paragraph (c).
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tion takes place in the state where the real property is situated.97 On
the other hand, "[i]n a typical dual probate estate, a Florida [domicili-
ary could] have all his personal property, tangible and intangible, pro-
bated by an unrelated non-Florida resident [e.g., the decedent's tax ad-
visor or attorney], in another state, under the judicial supervision of the
other state."98
In other words, a person emigrating to a foreign state could direct
in his will that all property, wherever situated, be subject to adminis-
tration in the state from which he emigrated. This tactic is useful espe-
cially where the named personal representative cannot qualify under
the new state's residency statute. For instance, Mr. Pincus could not
qualify as a personal representative in Florida and had Mr. Greenberg
so directed in his will, Mr. Pincus could have administered the bulk of
Greenberg's estate in New York even if it was situated in Florida. Had
Greenberg chosen this tactic, "the only assets subject to the simultane-
ous original probate in Florida would [have been] the real property lo-
cated in Florida which in many instances passes outside of probate by
virtue of joint ownership."99
CONCLUSION
Florida Statutes sections 733.302 and 733.304 do not prevent the
estate of a Florida resident from being probated within the state from
which he emigrated. 100 Therefore, in applying the statutes to Mr.
Greenberg's case, no violation can be found of his "fundamental" right
to appoint Mr. Pincus, an unrelated non-resident, as successor personal
representative to his estate. Moreover, this application would preclude
any alleged impingement on the testator's fundamental right to travel.
In addition, these Florida Statutes contain no provisions to prevent
such an unrelated, non-resident personal representative from earning a
personal representative's commission approved by the court of a foreign
state.1 1 "It is only if the decedent or his family chooses to forego dual
97. See generally REDFEARN, supra note 30, at § 20.13.
98. Answer Brief at 3.
99. Id. at 5.
100. Id.
101. See note 96 supra.
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probate and submit all the intangible personal property to probate in
the Florida Court that sections 733.302 and 733.304 will apply. ' 10 2
Since Mr. Greenberg chose to submit his estate to the laws of
Florida, sections 733.302 and 733.304 of the Florida Statutes were ap-
plied. In light of a challenge that the Florida Statutes violate the equal
protection and due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment and
the privileges and immunities clause of article IV, section 2 of the
United States Constitution, the Florida Supreme Court properly ap-
plied the United States Supreme Court precedent and upheld the con-
stitutionality of the Florida law.
Peter S. Broberg
102. Answer Brief at 5.
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